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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
CLOYD REED ALLRED, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10068 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant Cloyd Reed Allred has appealed from a 
conviction of the crime of grand larceny, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 38, Sections 1 and 4, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, in the Third Judicial District Court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was brought to trial on October 16, 1963 in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, charged with the crimes of burglary in the 
2nd degree and grand larceny. The appellant was found 
guilty by the jury of both crimes charged. On October 17, 
1963, subsequent to the time of the appellant's conviction 
on the above referenced charges, the court on its own mo-
tion vacated and set aside the conviction of burglary in the 
2nd degree ( R. 28) . 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent State of Utah submits that the appellant's 
conviction for the crime of grand larceny should be af-
firmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent State of Utah submits the following 
statement of facts as being more in keeping with the rule 
that the evidence will be reviewed on appeal in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. 
On September 5, 1963, Pete Sayatovich, who resided 
in Kim's Apartments in Copperton, Utah, heard a disturb-
ance outside of his apartment (R. 51). He observed two 
individuals, going up the side of a mountain adjacent to the 
apartments, carrying something (R. 52). Mr. Sayatovich 
examined the door to the entrance of Kim's Market, which 
was immediately downstairs from where he lived (R. 51), 
and noticed that the front door had been pried open and 
the padlock broken ( R. 52) . Ruth Goff, the proprietress of 
Kim's Market, indicated that when she closed the market 
on the 4th of September at 8: 00 p.m., she had locked and 
padlocked it and had closed and locked the backdoor to the 
premises (R. 61). At approximately 3 o'clock in the morn-
ing on the 5th of September, she examined the store prem-
ises and found that the front door had been forced open 
and the padlock was off the door. The backdoor was in the 
same condition that she left it (R. 61). An examination of 
the premises disclosed that 150 cartons of cigarettes, a .38 
caliber pistol, a pair of coveralls, a radio, Kennecott safety 
boots, a check protector and check book had been taken 
from the premises ( R. 63 through 70). 
At noon, on the 6th of September, 1963 (R. 95), Dep-
uty Sheriff Paul LaBounty saw the accused in the vicinity of 
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3rd South and 7th East in Salt Lake City (R. 95). Officer 
LaBounty had previously been given information from an 
informant that the appellant had been involved in the burg-
lary and larceny at Kim's Market (R. 46). Officer La-
Bounty went to locate the appellant and found him in Salt 
Lake City. The appellant was operating an automobile on 
7th East and Officer LaBounty made aU-tum and started 
to follow him. When he was within a distance of approxi-
mately 100 yards, the appellant pulled his automobile in a 
driveway, got out and ran from the automobile ( R. 96, 
110). Officer LaBounty approached the automobile and 
noticed boots and coveralls in the vehicle of the kind which 
had been taken in the burglary ( R. 9 7, 36) . The items were 
in plain sight on the front seat of the automobile (R. 37). 
On the 6th of September, Officer LaBounty went to an 
apartment at 230 South 7th East, where the appellant had 
been staying. The apartment was occupied by Donald 
Madsen, who accompanied the officer ( R. 44) . Mr. Mad-
sen invited the officer to come with him and search the 
apartment (R. 45). The appellant had moved from the 
apartment on the 5th of September ( R. 48) . Subsequent 
to that search, Officer LaBounty obtained a search warrant 
to search the same premises and recovered the .38 caliber 
pistol taken during the burglary. 
Subsequently, the appellant turned himself in at the 
county jail to deputy sheriffs. At that time, the appellant 
indicated that he had purchased the boots and coveralls 
from some one and that he did not know where the gun had 
come from ( R. 99) . The appellant stated that he could not 
recall where he had purchased the coveralls and boots but 
that he had obtained them from some store ( R. 100) . 
At the time of trial, Robert L. Nelson testified that a 
check (Prosecution Exhibit 4), payable to Frank Cardwell 
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and issued by Kim's Supermarket for $106.96, was passed 
at his store by the appellant (R. 107). The check (Exhibit 
4) was identified by Mrs. Goff as having been one of the 
blank checks taken with her check book and check pro-
tector during the burglary. 
While the appellant was confined in pretrial confine-
ment in the county jail, he sent a letter to a friend in which 
he stated: 
"Get everybody who was at the house that nite to testify that I 
was home all nite that I got home about 12 or 1 AM and stayed 
home until about 11 A.M. that morning because I had the flue 
and had been sick from Tues. until Friday. 
"Get a bill of sale for the coveralls size 34 with a blue lapel and a 
pair of 8-D Bond work shoes with high tops with steel toes and 
steel arch support." 
Prior to trial, the appellant made a motion to suppress 
the evidence relating to the coveralls, boots and gun on the 
grounds that they were obtained during an illegal search 
and seizure. The motion was denied ( R. 49) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF GRAND 
LARCENY. 
The evidence in the instant case overwhelmingly estab-
lishes the accused's guilt. The fact that the trial court dis-
missed the burglary conviction does not render the larceny 
conviction void, but merely tends to show the trial court 
was more lenient to the appellant than was warranted.1 
1 The appellant's statement that the trial court by its action somehow influ-
enced the jury's verdict does not follow (Brief, p. 5). The jury had ~lready 
returned its verdict and could not have in any way been concerned w1th the 
court's action. The State submits that the trial court erred in dismissing the 
burglary charge, since the same rule as to possession of recently stolen prop-
erty that applies to larceny applies to burglary. State v. Thomas, 121 U. 639, 
244 P.2d 653 ( 1952); State v. Manger, 7 U.2d 1, 315 P.2d 976 ( 1957); State 
v. Nichols, 106 U. 104, 145 P.2d 802 (1944). 
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76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading 
or driving away of the personal property of another. Possession 
of property recently stolen~ when the person in possession fails to 
makl' a satisfactory explanation~ shall be deemed prima facie 
evidfnce of guilt." 
Several Utah cases have held the evidence to be suffici-
ent to convict an accused of larceny, based upon the pre-
sumption arising from the possession of recently stolen 
property where the evidence was similar to that before the 
trial court in this case. In State v. Crowder, 114 U. 202, 
197 P.2d 917 (1948), this court upheld the accused's con-
\'iction of grand larceny, based upon evidence of possession 
of recently stolen property. The accused was seen in the 
vicinity of a house where $2,000 in cash in twenty dollar 
bills was stolen. Before the theft, he had very little money. 
Subsequently, he was seen to have $1,000 in twenty dollar 
bills. This court, in upholding the conviction, stated: 
"Appellant next contends that there was insufficient evidence 
to sustain a conviction. His argument to sustain this contention 
is that others also knew of Rottini's habits and the layout of his 
home, and that on two prior occasions small sums had been missed, 
and that on one such occasion his young son had taken it and on 
the other occasion another boy was suspected. As to that evidence 
it was a matter to be considered by the jury and not this court 
what weight they wished to give it in arriving at a conclusion of 
guilt or no guilt. Appellant also argues that there was no evidence 
connecting him with the crime since the only evidence introduced 
was that he was present in the vicinity of Rottini's home on one 
of the nights on which the money could have been stolen and that 
he was found in possession of $1000 in bills of the denomination 
of twenty dollars and such evidence only shows a possibility that 
the appellant took the money but is insufficient to show an actual 
theft by him. We cannot agree with such a contention. The jury 
could very reasonably find as it did from the evidence that appel-
lant's presence in the immediate vicinity of Rottini's home and 
his subsequent quick return to \Vyoming with a sum greatly in ex-
cess of any he was known to have had, and consisting of twenty 
dollar bills which was the denomination of the stolen bills, and 
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appellant's equivocal statements as to when he acquired these 
b1lls, that appellant had stolen those bills as charged." 
. In State v. Gillespie, 117 U. 114,213 P.2d 353 (1950), 
th1s court affirmed a conviction for larceny similar to that 
in this case although not as much evidence of guilt existed. 
This court stated : 
"* * * While the evidence may not be as complete as desired 
it is sufficient to permit the trial judge to find beyond a reasonabl~ 
doubt that the appellant is guilty. Under our statute the essential 
elements to be established by the state in prosecutions for larceny 
need be only property_ recently stolen) possession by the defendant) 
and an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession. These are all 
established in the present instance. The evidence is sufficient both 
to establish a prima facie case and to permit the court to find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
In this case the evidence clearly establishes the burglary 
of Kim's Market on the 5th of September 1963. It further 
clearly establishes that boots, coveralls and a gun were 
taken from the store, and these and other items were taken 
by two men. One day later, as Deputy Sheriff Paul La-
Bounty was working on the case, he sought to discuss the 
matter with the appellant. He saw the appellant in his 
automobile on 7th East in Salt Lake City and proceeded 
to make aU-turn to approach the appellant concerning the 
matter. As the appellant observed the officer, he pulled 
his car into a driveway and ran away. This evidence of 
flight is certainly inconsistent with innocence. Wigmore, 
Evidence,§ 276, 3rd Ed., notes: 
"Flight from justice, and its analogous conduct, have always 
been deemed indicative of a consciousness of guilt." 
The appellant himself admitted he ran and gave no reason-
able explanation. Further, the possession of the property in 
the appellant's car, which was stolen from Kim's Market, 
was conscious recent possession. The same may be said of 
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the .t.!:llll recovered from the appellant's former apartment. 
Further, the appellant's explanation of how he came to ac-
quire the property is contradictory and inconsistent. He 
told Officer LaBounty that he bought the boots and cover-
alls from someone, and then that he bought them at a store 
which he didn't recall. Another explanation was that he 
received them from "a couple of guys I know." This expla-
nation is refuted by Exhibit 5 in which the appellant tried 
to get his friend, while appellant was in jail, to establish an 
alibi and get evidence pertaining to his buying the stolen 
articles. The evidence amply sustains the conviction. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE AP-
PELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
The appellant's position that the coveralls, boots, and 
gun were obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure 
is untenable. The evidence clearly supports the conclusion 
that the above items were not obtained in violation of con-
stitutional principles against unreasonable searches and 
setzures. 
Deputy Sheriff LaBounty had received reliable evidence 
from an informant, that he knew to be dependable, that the 
appellant was involved in the burglary of Kim's Market. 2 
As a consequence, he desired to talk to the appellant con-
cerning his possible involvement. Officer LaBounty drove 
towards the area where the appellant lived and observed 
the appellant in a vehicle on 7th East Street in Salt Lake 
City. lTpon observing the appellant, LaBounty made a 
V-tum and turned on his red lighe in order to stop the ap-
3 Such information in and of itself may be a basis for apprehension and 
search or a search warrant. Rugendorf v. United States, 11 L.Ed.2d 837 
( 196-J.). 
s Appellant testified that he observed LaBounty and ran, and did not ob-
serve a light on the officer's car. 
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pellant and talk to him. He did not desire to apprehend or 
arrest the appellant. As he started to follow appellant and 
was some 100 yards away, the appellant drove his car into 
a driveway, got out and ran. Officer LaBounty approached 
the car, observed the stolen contraband on the front seat of 
the car. Officer LaBounty testified that he seized these 
items because he felt that if he left to get a warrant, the 
appellant might return and remove the vehicle. Cf. Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 ( 1925). There is no legal 
basis to contend that the seizure of these items was im-
proper. First, it is submitted that the officer did not arrest 
the appellant nor operate to arrest him. There is nothing 
wrong with an officer stopping a person to talk with him 
concerning his possible involvement in a crime. Leagre, 
The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 Journal 
of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 393, 417 
( 1963); United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir. 
1960). This does not constitute apprehension under Utah 
law and is a permissible use of the police power. In Gilliam 
v. United States, 189 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951), it was 
stated: 
"The stopping of appellant's car was not an arrest. No intent 
to apprehend appellant was shown and no move was made to take 
him into custody at that time. The officers did not open the car 
door when it was stopped, nor state that appellant was under ar-
rest, nor touch his person." 
See also Vaccaro v. United States, 296 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 
1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 890. Davis, Federal Searches 
and Seizures ( 1964). Remington, The Law Relating to 
"On Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Sus-
pected Persons and Police Privileges in General, 51 Journal 
of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 388 
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( 1960). In United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.Supp. 71 (DC 
N.Y. 1960), the court noted: 
"It is dear that the mere stopping of a car by a police officer 
is not such an illegal act that would taint all evidence stemming 
therefrom." 
State v. Beckendorf, 70 U. 360, 10 P.2d 1073 ( 1932) ; Wen-
delboe v. jacobson, 10 U.2d 344, 353 P.2d 118 ( 1960). 
In the instant case, the appellant's vehicle was not stop-
ped, the appellant himself abandoned the vehicle; as a con-
sequence, no act of the officer can be said to affect the 
search in this instance. 
In Davis, supra, at page 19, it is stated: 
"The courts have ruled that abandoned property, open fields 
and woods do not fall within the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. Under these rulings, officers are not 
required to have a warrant or other legal justification in order to 
search or seize such property." 
In the instant case, the appellant fled, leaving his prop-
erty in the presence of the officer. The car was parked in a 
driveway. The officer had every right to examine the aban-
doned property and seize the contraband. Hester v. United 
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Haerr v. United States, 240 
F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 195 7) . The officer acted properly when 
he seized the property and appellant may not complain. 
Additionally, and most obviously, the contraband was 
in "plain sight" on the front seat of the appellant's aban-
doned car. The officer had a right, as well as a duty, to 
seize the contraband. In Davis, supra,§ 9.11, at page 349, 
it is noted: 
"Assuming there is no unauthorized invasion of private prop-
erty, the mere observation or visual inspection of what is open and 
patent does not constitute a search. This is true whether the ob-
servations are made with the aid of natural or artificial light." 
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In Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1957), 
it is stated: 
. "A s~arch implie.s an examination of one's premises or person 
with a v~ew to the ~Iscovery ~f c:ontraband or evidence of guilt to 
be used m. pros~cut~on of a cnmmal action. The term implies ex-
ploratory mvest1gat10n or quest. 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures 
Sec. 1. Stopping the aut?mobile in quest of aliens was the duty of 
the Border Patrol, and It was a part of the performance of this 
duty to look into the automobile. Mere observation, however 
does not constitute a search. United States v. Lee, 1926, 274 U.S~ 
559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202; Ellison v. United States, D.C. 
Cir., 1953, 206 F.2d 476; United States v. Strickland, D.C.S.C., 
1945, 62 F.Supp. 468." 
In The Federal Law on Search and Seizure, F. B. I. ( 1962), 
it is stated: 
"It is not a search for the officer to merely see what is open and 
visible to the eye in or on the vehicle either by daylight or by artifi-
cial light. U. S. v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 ( 1927). 'Police officers in 
dealing with investigation of crime are not required to blindfold 
themselves.' U. S. v. O'Brien, 174 F2d 341 (1949); Smith v. 
U. S., 2 F2d 715 ( 1924); Petteway v. U. S., 261 F2d 63 ( 1958). 
It is not a search for the officer to shine his flashlight into the 
vehicle at night. Smith v. U. S., supra; U. S. v. Strickland, 62 
F.Supp. 468 (1945); Haerr v. U.S., 240 F2d 533 (1957); U.S. 
v. O'Brien, 174 F2d 341 (1949) (open end of a truck). The 
officer has a right to shine his light into the vehicle at night 'for his 
own protection, if for no other reason.' Bell v. U.S. 254 F2d 82 
( 1958), cert. den. 358 U.S. 885. In a patrol boat, he may use the 
searchlight. U. S. v. Lee, supra. The information which the 
officer obtains by looking into the vehicle or any part of it which 
he may see without any action of opening a door or other part has 
been lawfully obtained without a search." 
It becomes obvious, therefore, that the officer in the in-
stant case acted within the law in obtaining the boots and 
coveralls from the appellant's vehicle. 
With reference to the search of the apartment, where 
appellant lived, it appears that the search on September 6, 
1963 was at the permission and invitation of the then occu-
pant. The accused had moved out on September 5, 1963 
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and Officer LaBounty examined the premises upon the con-
sent of the then occupant. Consequently, the first search 
was based on consent. People v. Torres, 158 Cal.App.2d 
21J. 322 P.2d 300 ( 1958). Even so, nothing appears to 
have been discovered and obtained during that search. Sub-
sequently, the search was made pursuant to a search war-
rant and the pistol obtained. Consequently, that item was 
not illegally obtained. McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 
95 (1927); United States v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963 (1923). 
Davis, supra, § 2.0. 
The appellant's contention that he was denied his con-
stitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is with-
out any merit. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY. 
The appellant has challenged the court's giving of vari-
ous instructions to the jury. The appellant challenges In-
struction No. 7 given by the court (R. 123), contending 
that this is an inappropriate instruction. The facts of the 
instant case clearly show that as Deputy Sheriff LaBounty 
approached the appellant the day after the commission of 
the burglary at Kim's Market, the appellant stopped his car 
and ran from the officer. The instruction given by the court 
is generally in accordance with Instruction No. 36, Cali-
fornia Jury Instructions, Criminal, based upon the Cali-
fornia Penal Code, Section 1127 (c). As previously noted, 
flight is evidence from which an inference of guilt may be 
dra\\n. \Vigmore, Evidence, § 276, infra page 6. In the 
instant case the jury was instructed that flight in and of it-
self was not sufficient to prove guilt but was merely a cir-
cumstance \\·hich they could consider. The fact that the ap-
pellant subsequently turned himself in does not necessarily 
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diminish the inference that could have been properly 
drawn from appellant's flight. In People v. Jordan, 290 
P.2d 484 (Cal. 1955), the California Supreme Court up-
held the same instruction as was given in this case. Since 
the evidence amply justified an inference of guilt from ap-
pellant's flight and the instruction was not otherwise im-
proper, no error can be claimed. 
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred 
in giving Instruction No.8 (a) ( R. 126, 127). The instruc-
tion given was appropriate to the admission into evidence 
and the circumstances surrounding Exhibit 4, which was a 
check taken from Kim's Market on the morning of Septem-
ber 5, 1963. The evidence showed that the check had in 
fact been taken from the market and that subsequently the 
appellant passed the check to a grocer. The check was re-
turned, indicating that the payee's signature was not an 
authorized signature. The court clearly instructed the jury 
that the accused was not charged with any check offense 
and indicated that Exhibit 4 could only be considered for 
what evidentiary weight it might have on the burglary and 
grand larceny charges. The appellant contends that the 
court erred in indicating in the instruction that Exhibit 4 
might show the commission of another offense. Exhibit 4 
and the circumstances surrounding accused's possession of 
it, in fact, did show such actions on the part of the appellant 
from which it might be inferred that another offense had 
been committed. 76-26-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
makes it a criminal offense to forge a negotiable instrument, 
and 76-26-6 makes it a crime to pass any such instrument. 
76-26-7 makes it a crime to issue any fraudulent paper and 
makes it criminal conduct to pass a fictitious check. These 
are all offenses which the facts and circumstances surround-
ing this case might lead a reasonable person to believe the 
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accused had committed. The court, therefore, properly 
advised the jury that this evidence could be considered by 
them to the extent that it related to the burglary and, 
further, properly advised the jury that the accused was not 
in fact charged with a check offense. Thus, an appropriate 
cautionary instruction, preliminary to the substantive in-
struction, was given and it cannot be said that the instruc-
tion was in any way prejudicial. The facts and circum-
stances concerning other crimes are relevant-
"To complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its 
immediate context of happenings near in time and place." 
1\l cC ormick on Evidence at page 328 ( 1954). 
The appellant objects to the court having given Instruc-
tion No. 3, claiming that the instruction failed to state the 
appellant's theory of the case (R. 121). Instruction No. 3 
is merely a statement of the elements of the crime of larceny 
and burglary. This instruction was exactly what this court 
in People v. Flynn, 7 U. 378, 26 Pac. 1114 ( 1891), said the 
trial court should give. The fact that some other instruction 
would have better suited the appellant's case is immaterial. 
If appellant had desired an instruction on a particular issue, 
it was up to the appellant to make a request. Abbott, Crim-
inal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., § 661. Obviously, no error ex-
ists on this point. 
The appellant contends that it was error to give Instruc-
tion No. 6 ( R. 123). This instruction merely informed the 
jury that grand larceny requires that they find the value of 
the property taken to be in excess of fifty dollars and indi-
cated that they could add the value of the various items 
taken in making a determination. This is an appropriate 
statement of the law. The jury had before it evidence of a 
number of items having been taken from Kim's Market. 
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They also had the value placed upon the items by the pro-
prietress and other evidence upon which value could be 
established. This, therefore, raised a jury question and the 
jury was properly advised on the issue. It is, of course, ap-
propriate to join the value of all items taken where the lar-
ceny of many items was in fact one larceny. 
None of the instructions to which the appellant objects 
were in any way improper and in no way can be determined 
to be prejudicial. 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, ex-
pressly requires that before a case can be reversed, it must 
appear that the error was of such a grave nature as to affect 
the substantial rights of a party. Prejudicial error is not 
presumed. This rule is equally applicable to instructions in 
criminal cases. State v. HallJ 105 U. 162, 145 P.2d 494 
( 1943). 
CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the evidence in the instant case makes it 
manifest that the accused's guilt was proved beyond any 
reasonable doubt by overwhelming evidence. The legal 
errors assigned for reversal are without merit. The trial of 
the accused did not deprive him of any substantial right 
which would warrant this court in reversing. The court 
should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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